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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAURIAN P. CHARLESWORTH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA and 
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO: 890297-CA 
PRIORITY: 14b 
Appeal from an Order of the 
Second Judicial District Court 
Of Weber County 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The subject matter of this appeal is that of a domestic 
relations Order relative to child support and visitation. 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant 
to the Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (h) which states: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, 
over: 
(h) appeals from district court 
involving domestic relations cases, 
including but not limited to divorce, 
annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption 
and paternity;... 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In 1988 Blanca H. Charlesworth and the State of 
California by and through the State of Utah petitioned the 
District Court for the County of Weber, State of Utah, to 
obtain an obligation of support against Laurian P. 
Charlesworth pursuant to the Utah Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement of Support Act, (hereinafter referred to as 
URESA). 
At a hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner 
for Weber County, a payment of child support was determined 
to be paid by Mr. Charlesworth in the sum of $76.00 per 
month per child, payable through the Weber County Clerk's 
Office, but conditioned upon Mr. Charlesworth being able to 
visit with the minor children. An objection was filed by 
Blanca H. Charlesworth and the State of California through 
the Utah Attorney General's Office to the Commissioner's 
recommendations and the trial Judge, Stanton M. Taylor, 
affirmed the recommendations of the Commissioner, ordering 
Mr. Charlesworth to pay the sum of $76.00 per month per 
child uO the Clerk of the Court with said sums to be re-
tained by the Clerk of the Court until such time as Mr. 
Charlesworth was able to exercise visitation with the minor 
children which benefit he had been denied of since the time 
of the divorce filed by Mr. Charlesworth in the State of 
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Utah and finalized August 12, 1983. With the reaffirmation 
by the Trial Court of the Commissioner's recommendation, 
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal to this forum. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion 
in an equity matter. 
2. Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate visitation privileges in a proceeding under the 
URESA when the original Decree was entered in the responding 
state. 
3. Whether the payment of child support can be 
terminated or withheld as a result of the non-custodial 
parent being unable to exercise his rights of visitation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 1. 19£3, the Respondent as Plaintiff filed 
a Complaint in the District Court of Weber County for a 
divorce. Almost immediately or simultaneously, the Defen-
dant/Appellant left the State of Utah for Santa Monica, 
California, and the Respondent obtained service by publica-
tion of Summons. (See Trial Record pp. 1, 4 and 11) 
Thereafter the Flaintiff was awarded a Decree of 
Divorce on August 12, 1983, by the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby, District Courr Judge, with an award of the minor 
children of the parties to the Defendant subject to reason-
able visitation by the Plaintiff and a further Order in the 
Decree that child support should be held in abeyance until 
further order of the Court. (See Trial Record pp. 13-23). 
Thereafter on July 5, 1988, almost five years after the 
entry of the original Decree of Divorce, the Defen-
dant/Appellant by and through the Assistant Attorney General 
of the State of Utah under the Utah Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act (hereinafter referred to as 
URESA), filed a Petition for child support. (See Trial 
Record p. 26-41). The Department of Social Services for the 
State of Utah served the Petition for support and Order to 
Show Cause upon the Plaintiff/Respondent under and pursuant 
to the Utah URESA, Utah Code Annotated § 77-31-1, 1953 as 
amended. 
A hearing was held before the Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Maurice Richards, on the 18th day of October, 
1988, wherein the Commissioner recommended that commencing 
November, 1988, the Plaintiff/Respondent pay to the Defen-
dant/Appellant $76.00 per month per child as and for the 
three (3) minor children, but that the Weber County Clerk's 
Office be directed to hold the funds until the Defendant 
allowed the Plaintiff visitation with the minor children, 
which was entered November 14, 1988. (See Trial Record pp. 
58 & 59) 
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Thereafter on November 16, 1988, Defendant/Appellant 
filed an objection to the Recommended Order on the grounds 
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to address any-
other issues other than child support since it was a URESA 
action and requested a hearing in front of a Judge. (See 
Trial Record pp. 60-61). The objection hearing was heard on 
December 12, 1988, with argument by the parties through 
their counsel. The Trial Court affirmed the recommendations 
of the Commissioner and reserved the ruling on the support 
abatement, ordering the child support be held by the Clerk. 
Plaintiff was allowed visitation the day after Christmas 
with counsel scheduling a future hearing date for a report 
on the status of visitation arrangements. (See Trial Record 
p. 65) . 
On March 13, 1989, a review was had on the visitation 
and a possible release of child support monies, before the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Judge Presiding, and evidence 
was presented that the Plaintiff/Respondent was still unable 
to contact the•Defendant for visitation and had not seen his 
children since Appellantfs original leaving from the State 
of Utah in February of 1983. The Trial Court again ordered 
that all payments of support made by the Plain-
tiff/Respondent should remain with the Clerk of the Court 
until such time as the Plaintiff was able to contact the 
Defendant and work out visitation with his three (3) minor 
children. (See Trial Record pp. 73-74). 
From this Order the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 
bringing this matter to the attention of this Court. (See 
Trial Record p. 75). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Appellate Court in reviewing matters in equity 
and more specifically, in a divorce action, will refrain 
from disturbing the findings of the Trial Court unless a 
clear abuse of discretion is shown. 
2. The Trial Court did not err in exercising juris-
diction over the issue cf visitation and child support as 
that had already been conferred, both in personam and 
subject matter jurisdiction from the previous divorce action 
regardless of the pending URESA action. 
3. The retainage by the Trial Court with the Clerk of 
the Court of a child support payment can be made contingent 
upon an obligation by the custodial parent to allow free 
exercise of visitation, especially in view of a potenticn 




THIS COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE FINDINGS 
OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE IS A 
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CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A DIVORCE 
PROCEEDING. 
The standard for reviewing matters in equity was 
recently considered by the Utah Supreme Court in J & M 
Const., Inc., v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), wherein 
the Court held as follows: 
In reviewing matters m equity, 
this Court will reverse the trial court 
only [emphasis added] when the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the 
findings below. Although we may review 
that evidence, we are particularly 
mindful of the advantaged position of 
the trial court to hear, weigh, and 
evaluate the testimony of the parties, 
(cite omitted) Where the evidence may 
be in conflict, this Court will not 
upset the findings belcv; unless the 
evidence so clearly preponderates 
against them that this Court is con-
vinced that a manifest injustice has 
been done... 
The Court of Appeals of Utah in the recent decision of 
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) held as 
follows: 
This Court will refrain from 
disturbing findings of the trial court 
in a divorce action unless a clear abuse 
of discretion is shown. (cite omitted) 
The trial court is clearly in the best 
position to weigh the evidence, deter-
mine creditabilty and arrive at factual 
conclusions... 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
EXERCISING JURISDICTION WHICH IT PROPER-
LY H£D TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE THE ISSUES 
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INVOLVING VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT 
REGARDLESS OF THE PENDING URESA ACTION. 
The State of Utah in behalf of the State of California 
has argued that the Weber County District Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate issues involving visita-
tion in a URESA action. In support of this premise and 
argument, the Appellant cites this Court to several cases, 
none of which are Utah cases so they are therefore persua-
sive and not binding case law. 
A careful and thorough review of each of the cases 
would indicate that their facts are very distinguishable 
from the immediate case at hand. In Patterson v. Patterson, 
581 P.2d 824 (Kan. App. 1978), a Decree of Divorce was 
entered in Texas where the Court ordered the father to pay 
child support, granting custody to the mother and awarding 
the father rights of visitation. Thereafter the father 
moved to Kansas and the mother initiated a URESA petition 
seeking enforcement of the child support order in the 
responding State of Kansas, or the state in which the father 
presently was residing with the petitioner still residing in 
the State of Texas or the original state of divorce. The 
Kansas Court of Appeals did reverse the Trial Court in 
conditioning disbursement or payment of the child support 
upon the mother fulfilling the father!s visitation rights, 
explaining that this order was beyond the jurisdiction of 
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the State of Kansas, the state the father had moved to. It 
is true that nothing in the Act had allowed the adjudication 
of child custody, visitation privileges or other matters, 
only determined in domestic relations cases. The Patterson 
case as well as all other cases cited by the Appellant is 
distinguishable from the immediate case at hand because in 
this case the Appellant who is the petitioning party was 
divorced in this State and voluntarily moved to the State of 
California during the time of the divorce, taking the minor 
children with her, while the Respondent who is the obligor 
has remained in the same county in the State of Utah 
throughout this action, having originally initiated the 
divorce in the State of Utah. The Respondent did obtain 
reasonable rights of visitation and an Order that child 
support be held in abeyance until further order of the Utah 
Court, which was signed on the 12th day of August, 1983. 
Under the Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5, and particular-
ly subsection (3), the Code authorizes this State to contin-
ue to adjudicate and determine matters of child support and 
visitation, which states as follows: 
(3) The Court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes 
or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of zhe children and their support, 
maintenance, health, dental care, or 
the distribution of the property as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
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Accordingly, under the Utah Code Annotated, the State 
of Utah maintains jurisdiction on a continuing basis for any 
subsequent modification or enforcement of the Decree of 
Divorce and its terms, including the enforcement of reason-
able rights of visitation, which in this case were granted 
by the Trial Court after proper service of the Complaint 
upon the Appellant. 
The Utah Code Annotated § 78-27-24 in particular 
subparagraph (6) confers "long-arm" jurisdiction over the 
Appellant with service accomplished pursuant to Rule 4 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which in this case was a 
Summons done by publication. Subsection (6) of the Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-27-24 reads as follows: 
Any person, notwithstanding § 
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the follow-
ing enumerated acts, submits himself,... 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of 
this state as to any claim arising from: 
(6) With respect to actions of 
divorce , separate maintenance, child 
support, having resided in, the marital 
relationship, within this state, not-
withstanding subsequent departure from 
the state;... 
The Appellant in this divorce action took the minor 
children of the parties from the State of Utah on the day of 
or subsequent to the filing by the Respondent for the 
divorce in the State of Utah, and fled with the minor 
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children to the State of California. During that more than 
six (6) year time period, the Respondent has not had any 
access, either telephonically or in person or by mail, with 
the Appellant nor the parties1 minor children. This fleeing 
from the State of Utah did not deprive the State of Utah of 
its "long-arm" jurisdiction, because the Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-27-24(6) indicates that since the parties resided in a 
marital relationship within this State, notwithstanding any 
subsequent departure from this State, the Appellant is 
subject to the jurisdiction of this State with respect to 
actions of divorce, separate maintenance or child support. 
Accordingly, because the State of Utah is the state of 
original jurisdiction wherein the divorce was commenced, 
completed and an Order or Decree of Divorce having been 
entered regarding child support and child visitation, this 
Court has continuing jurisdiction in regards to those 
matters and the Appellant by availing herself of this 
action, even though through a State agency and through a 
URESA petition, such action does not deprive this State of 
its continuing jurisdiction to grant to the Respondent and 
consider issues of contempt or failure to allow visitation. 
Constitutionally the XIV Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States, in particular Section 1, states: 
...No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the 
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privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the protection of the laws. 
Even more importantly, the Constitution of Utah, 
Article 1, Section 7, states: 
No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of lav/. 
Under these facts, to deny the Respondent his full rights 
under the Decree of Divorce without a full hearing on not 
only the issue of modification for child support reasons, 
but also whether or not there is contempt or a failure by 
the Appellant to obey a Court Order such that she is avail-
ing herself of the laws of the State of Utah with ''unclean 
hands" would be a denial of the Respondent's procedural due 
process rights, depriving him of income for support of 
children that he has not seen since the original entry of 
the Decree of Divorce in 1983. 
In State ex rel. State of Washington v. Bozarth, 722 
P.2d 48 (Or. App. 1986), as cited by the Appellant, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals determined that "interference with 
visitation rights may not be raised in" a URESA petition. 
In that case a proceeding for enforcement of child support 
under URESA was initiated in the State of Washington and 
transferred to the State of Oregon, and the State of Oregon 
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refused to exercise jurisdiction for any purpose other than 
the collection of child support. Again, as in the previous 
case cited by the Appellant and as distinguishable from this 
case, the paren- and child that were seeking the child 
support resided in the State of Washington which was the 
home state of the Defendant child, and which state would 
have subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction 
to determine custody and visitation and not the State of 
Oregon where the obligor resided. Any interference with 
visitation rights was not a defense to the proceeding 
involving the dependent child whose home state was 
Washington. In this case a URESA action was brought to this 
State, the original state of the divorce which has continu-
ing jurisdiction as distinguishable from the original State 
of Washington in Bozarth, supra, which was bringing the 
proceeding in the State of Oregon where the obligor resides. 
Additionally, the State of Oregon has a statute, to-wit: 
ORS 110.176 which provides that ORS 107.431 in modification 
proceedings changes the common law rules of support obliga-
tions and visitation rights as independent. Under the 
Oregon statute ORS 110.176, ORS 107.431 shall not apply to a 
proceeding under URESA when the child to whom a duty of 
support is owed is in another state which has enacted the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, and a Court in that 
-1 ?-
state would have subject matter and personal jurisdiction 
under that Act to determine custody and visitation rights. 
Therefore another distinguishable fact between the immediate 
case and the Bozarth case is that Utah does not have a 
statute at all similar to ORS 107.431 or ORS 110.176. 
In the case of State of Oregon, ex rel. State of 
Alaska, Child Support Division, ex rel. Lacey v. Hargrove, 
747 P.2d 366 (Or. App. 1987), the Oregon Court relied on 
Bozarth, supra, and another Oregon statute, to-wit: ORS 
25.240, wherein the Oregon legislation clearly indicated 
that parents may not use legal custody as a shield to deny 
support obligations under ORS Chapter... 110 or URESA. 
Again, that case is distinguishable from the irjuediate case 
at hand in that rhere is not in the State of Utah any of the 
three statutes referred to in the two Oregon cases, and as 
cited earlier, this State Court or the Trial Court does have 
continuing jurisdiction to determine matters raised by 
either of the parties in regards support and visitation. 
In the Wisconsin case of State ex rel. Hubbard v. 
Hubbard, 329 N.K.2d 202 (Wis. 1983), cited by Appellant, 
facts are distinguishable from the immediate case at hand. 
The State of California has both subject matter jurisdiction 
and personal jurisdiction over the two parties having 
entered the original Decree of Divorce and having entered an 
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order of support. The support order was under URESA trans-
ferred to the State of Wisconsin where the obligee resided 
and the Wisconsin Court determined that it did not have 
jurisdiction under URESA or an interstate enforcement of a 
support obligation to consider matters of custody, visita-
tion or custodial parents contempt because the responding 
Court's consideration of those issues would burden the 
efficiency of the URESA mechanism. Again, as distinguished 
from the immediate case at hand, the Wisconsin Court had not 
entered the original Decree of Divorce and specifically 
indicated that California, the initiating state, h ad oricri — 
nal subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction 
over the parties to consider these issues. 
In the case of Vigil v. Vigil, 494 P.2d 609 (Colo. App. 
1972), the facts are again distinguishable from this immedi-
ate case in that the parties never availed themselves of a 
divorce action in either the responding state of Colorado 
where the obligor resided nor in the initiating state of 
California where the obligee resided. The parties had not 
been divorced, the custodial parent had simply left the 
State of Colorado with the children to the State of 
California and thereafter initiated a URESA action to obtain 
an Order for the support of the children. Neither a divorce 
nor custody nor visitation nor support were ever addressed 
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in either one of the states and there was no continuing 
jurisdiction in the State of Colorado or California as there 
is in the State of Utah in the immediate case at hand. 
In the Colorado Supreme Court case of County of 
Clearwater v. Petrash, 598 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1979) (En Banc), 
although the parties were divorced in the State of Colorado 
and it was the responding State as in the immediate case at 
hand, the State of Colorado has a specific and direct 
statute on point in its URESA statute found at § 14-5-124, 
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Supp.) which provides in part that: 
...The determination or enforcement 
of a duty of support owed to one obligee 
shall be unaffected by any interference 
by another obligee with rights of 
custody or visitation granted by a 
court. 
The State of Utah does not have a similar statute directly 
on point, and in fact it does have a statute cited earlier 
indicating that this Court would have continuing jurisdic-
tion under the immediate facts where the Decree was granted 
in the State of Utah allowing for specific visitation rights 
and not granting child support. 
The Appellant then cites this Honorable Court to the 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-31-38, 77-31-31 and 77-31-9. In 
contrast to those statutes, the Respondent five or six years 
prior to any action taken through a URESA petition had 
already established subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
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jurisdiction over the Appellant and the Respondent through a 
divorce action that was filed and properly served in the 
State of Utah. Jurisdiction does exist for that reason and 
continues pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 for this 
Court, in particular the Weber County District Court, to 
reconsider those issues originally brought in the Complaint 
for divorce and which were entered in the Divorce Decree by 
this Court as a direct, if not an ancillary proceeding to 
the URESA petition which more than simply coincidentally was 
brought in the same exact action with the same exact civil 
number, rather than as an independent action. 
The Pifer v. Pifer, 229 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. 1976) case 
again involves parties that were divorced in the State of 
Florida, the obligor moved to another state, North Carolina, 
and subsequent thereto the obligee filed a petition for 
support in Florida under a URESA action which was trans-
ferred to North Carolina and the North Carolina Court found 
that there was no jurisdiction over the subject matter, 
therefore, the judgment was void. Again, those facts are 
distinguishable from the immediate case ar hand as indicated 
earlier. In this case the obligor has remained in the State 
where the divorce was entered, there is continuing jurisdic-
tion, both subject matter and personal, over the obligee, 
which is distinguishable from North Carolina attempting to 
exercise subject matter and/or personal jurisdiction over an 
obligee who has simply initiated a URESA petition in that 
state where the original divorce was in her resident state 
of Florida. 
The case of Hoover v. Hoover, 246 S.E.2d 179 (S.C. 
1978) cites to Pifer, supra, in holding that a Court of a 
responding state has no jurisdiction to adjudicate matters 
of visitation. But a careful review of that case would 
again indicate that it is distinguishable from this case. 
In Hoover, no divorce action was ever initiated in either 
the initiating or responding state, but instead Mrs. Hoover 
initiated an action in Michigan, the initiating state under 
the URESA provisions for support of herself and of the two 
children, which action was transferred to South Carolina as 
a responding state. South Carolina refused to exercise and 
recognize jurisdiction for the adjudication of child custody 
or visitation privileges. Again, no action was ever initi-
ated in South Carolina by either of the parties other than 
through the URESA, whereas in the immediate case the divorce 
was initiated and concluded in Utah and there is continuing 
jurisdiction over those matters. 
In Bowen v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602 (Utah 9152), it simply 
stands for the premises that if a judgment is entered 
without jurisdiction the Order is void on its base for lack 
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of jurisdiction. That is not the issue here. If jurisdic-
tion is indeed lacking, then any judgment entered without 
jurisdiction would be void but the Respondent's argument is 
that there is continuing jurisdiction and personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction to enter an Order in regards to 
visitation and support independent and ancillary of the 
URESA action. 
In Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 294 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. 1980), 
the Court of Appeals specifically held that "[T]he Act does 
not, of course, grant in personam jurisdiction over a 
non-resident party not otherwise subject to the power of the 
Michigan Courts." Again in this case, the parties were 
already subject both in personam and under subject matter to 
the jurisdiction of the State of Utah distinguishing this 
case • 
In Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (Kan. 1974), the 
state of divorce and where all parties resided with the 
exception of the ex-husband, was Missouri, which was also 
the initiating state. The State of Kansas, which was the 
responding state and which is where the obligor resided, 
refused to submit the obligee to the jurisdiction of the 
responding Court in other independent proceedings involving 
collateral matters. Again, this case is distinguishable 
because no divorce proceedings were ever initiated in the 
responding State of Kansas, all action was taken other than 
the URESA action in the State of Missouri. 
Accordingly, with a review of every single case cited 
by the Appellant, the District Court of Weber County, State 
of Utah, based on the authority cited by Respondent, main-
tains continuing jurisdiction both in personam and subject 
matter over the parties concerning all issues including not 
only child support, but visitation, be they ancillary or 
directly dependent matters in relation to the URESA action 
seeking child support. If for no other reason than that of 
judicial economy with the fact that there is continuing 
jurisdiction in the State of Utah over these matters, the 
Weber County District Court for the State of Utah did have 
jurisdiction and the Court did not err in exercising juris-
diction to hear and adjudicate an issue involving visitation 
as either an ancillary dependent or independent cause of 
action pursuant to a URESA petition in the same exact civil 
action. The Order of the District Court Judge should be 
affirmed. 
POINT III. 
A CONTINUOUS PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT AS 
AN OBLIGATION CAN BE MADE CONTINGENT 
UPON THE FREE EXERCISE OF VISITATION. 
The Appellant is not seeking child support arrearage, 
which Respondent believes she would not be entitled to 
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anyways under Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977), 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that "alimony and 
support payments become unalterable debts as they accrue and 
therefore a periodic installment cannot be changed or mod-
ified after the installments have become due". In the 
immediate case the Trial Court specifically found that there 
was to be no payment of child support until further order of 
the Court. 
In regards to an adjudication as to issues of visita-
tion and child support and their inter-relation, while it is 
true that the Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-3 states that 
"every man shall support his child;...11, and that Hills v. 
Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981), and the other cases cited 
by the Appellant would indicate that the "right to support 
from the parents belongs to the minor children and is not 
subject to being bartered away, extinguished, stopped or in 
any way defeated by the agreement or the conduct of the 
parents.11 The Utah Supreme Court did find in Peterson v. 
Peterson, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974), that the custodial 
parent seeking payment of child support after the Trial 
Court in that case had entered the following Order: "The 
payment of child support is suspended until such time as the 
Plaintiff appears in person... and purges herself of con-
tempt." was not entitled to Court action. In Peterson, 
some nine and a half years prior to the bringing of a 
petition to modify to award child support to the custodial 
parent, the non-custodial parent brought an Order to Show 
Cause why the custodial parent should not be held in con-
tempt for failure to comply with the visitation rights 
provision and the Order cited to above was entered as a 
result thereof. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Peterson further held as 
follows: 
There is no question but that Mrs. P was 
in contempt of court, after having been 
in such straits for 9h years, when she 
applied for the support money judgment, 
without have purged herself of the 
contempt. That requirement was a 
condition precedent to obtaining the 
support money, i.e., -the exercise of 
Mr. Pfs right to see his children. Mrs. 
P had not permitted this, which became 
the basis for her contempt. In short, 
she had not done and is not doing equity 
the while she insists on it, by now 
seeking, without any displayed 
penitence, remcrse or strings attached, 
to invoke the very jurisdiction of the 
same court that she flouted before. She 
was in no conscionable position to do so 
and the court need not have entertained 
her petition. To coin a paraphrased 
maxim of equity and reduce it to pigeon 
English, "One ray not make a monkey out 
of the Court," - without cause, that is. 
In the immediate case at hand, although admittedly an 
Order to Show Cause for contempt has not been brought, the 
Trial Court had ordered in the original Decree of Divorce 
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six years earlier, that child support be held in abeyance 
until further order of the Court while at the same time 
ordering custody in the Appellant subject to reasonable 
visitation by the Respondent. 
In both of the transcripts, testimony was proffered 
that the Respondent has never seen the children since 
February of 1983, and accordingly the Trial Court in affirm-
ing the recommendation of the Commissioner did order the 
payment of child support at the rate of $76.00 per month per 
child and did also conditionally order that that money be 
held in abeyance and not disbursed until such time as 
visitation under the Utah Court Order originally entered six 
years previous was complied with. This in effect would 
constitute a contempt which has yet to be purged by the 
Appellant. The Appellant is attempting to exercise in 
equity the jurisdiction of this Court through a URESA action 
which is somewhat misleading in that even though the initi-
ating state was the State of California, the actual support 
order being enforced is a support order established in the 
State of Utah modifying an original Utah Decree of Divorce. 
The Appellant has come into the Court with "unclean hands". 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Johnson, 
560 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), an ex-spouse brought an Order to 
Show Cause and contempt citation against the former husband 
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on a claim of willful disobedience ot tne Divorce Decree as 
it pertained to payment of debts and obligations, utilities 
and attorneyfs fees. The Supreme Court in that case chose 
not to believe the former wife's testimony that she knew 
nothing about damage to a truck and camper allegedly in her 
possession and concluded that she was without "clean hands", 
and thus not in a position to seek equity, resulting in the 
dismissal of the Order to Show Cause and contempt citation• 
The Court held as follows: 
As general rule , party in contempt 
will not be heard by court when he 
wishes to make a motion or grant a 
favor. 
In this case, after a review of the 
evidence, the Court chose not to believe 
Appellantfs testimony that she knew 
nothing about the damage to the truck 
and camper and concluded she was without 
"clean hands" and hence not in a posi-
tion to seek equity and the Court was 
well within the bounds of discretion in 
dismissing the Order to Show Cause and 
contempt citation. 
Neither of the cases cited by the Respondent have been 
overturned or modified and should be taken into consid-
eration in light of the Appellant's constant refusal to 
grant the Respondent visitation. 
As a further issue as to whether or not this Court 
should simply recognize the Petitioner's request for child 
support while ignoring other issues, the applicable Utah 
URESA statute found at Utah Code Annotated § 77-31-1 et. 
seq. in particular UCA § 77-31-11 entitled "Contents of 
Petition for Support11, states as follows: 
The petition shall be verified and 
shall state the name and, so far as 
known to the petitioner, the address and 
circumstances of the respondent and his 
dependents for whom support is sought, 
and all other pertinent information. 
Neither the initiating State of California nor the 
responding State of Utah has stated the address of the 
dependents for whom support is sought so that a question 
arises as to the actual validity of the URESA petition. It 
has been a practice of the Department of Social Services and 
in particular the Office of Recovery Services under the 
Attorney General, to interpret § 11 of the Utah URESA to 
require the original petition to state the address and 
circumstances of the Respondent and his dependents for whom 
support is sought and to require that the obligee provide 
and update the address for the children. If the current 
address is not provided, then the agency feels the Court 
should hold the forwarding of any child support payments 
made by the obligor until the address is provided. 
Accordingly, based upon the case authority of the 
Respondent and the policy of the Department of Social 
Services, the Office of Recovery Services, the Commissioner 
as affirmed by the Trial Court is fully within legal rights 
to condition the payment to the State agency upon the 
allowance of the Respondent to exercise his visitation 
rights as established by the Trial Court six years previous 
and which have been and are still being denied to the 
present date. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court of the State of Utah in Weber 
County, had from 1983 to the present, both in personam and 
subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and continuing 
jurisdiction under Utah statutes, and particularly in light 
of the URESA petition being filed as part of the original 
1983 divorce action to intermingle the issue of on-going 
child support and visitation and consider both simultaneous-
ly or one as an ancillary but considerable cause of action. 
With the in personam and subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider those issues, the Commissioner as affirmed by the 
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in the allowing an 
order of child support at the rate of $76.00 per month per 
child as in essence a modification of the original Decree of 
Divorce which allowed no support until further order of the 
Court. It was not an abuse of discretion to condition the 
release of those monies from the custody of the Court upon 
the allowance by the Appellant of visitation as ordered by 
- ? f i -
the Trial Court more than six years ago and which has never 
been allowed. 
WHEREFORE, the final Order of the Trial Court should 
not be reversed but should be affirmed and costs awarded. 
DATED this ) / d a y of September, 198 9. 
PETTTN. VLAffOS X 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
0 <L '6 b » J 
MAX D. LAMPH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2564 Washington Blvd. #1 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 399-5885 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY . 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 84525 
rnis action came on regularly for hearing on the 1st day 
of August, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge 
of the abov£-entitled Court; MAX D. LAMPH appearing as counsel 
for Plaintiff and Plaintiff appearing in person, and Defendant 
having been duly served with process and her default for failure 
to answer or otherwise plead 10 Plaintiff's Complaint within 
time allowed by law, and the Court having hearing thp evidence 
introduced by Plaintiff, and the matter being submitted to the 
Court for its decision, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises now makes and enters it: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff now is and for more than three months 
next prior to the commencement of this action has been an actual 
moAti II 09 Ar 'b 
K 0 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Page 2 
Charlesworth vs. Charlesworth 
Civil No- 84525 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other 
in Los Angeles, California, on April 14, 1979, and ever since 
have been and now are husband and wife. 
3. That three children have probably been born as issue of 
this marriage, to-wit: JOSEPH, born February 3, 1980, and 
PATRICK, born January 7, 1982, and possibly a third child born 
in March 1983. 
4. That Defendant has been guilty of cruel treatment of 
the Plaintiff to the extent of causing him great mental distress 
in rhat Defendant was never satisfied with Plaintiff's employment 
and Defer/Jont frequ*Mt.Iy absentized herself from the home ci the 
parties and returned to live with her folks, and Defendant informed 
Plaintiff that she was no longer in love with him. 
5. That the Plaintiff has been employed at Westland Ford 
since July 1982, and has an average gross earnings of approximately 
$750.00 per month. 
From the foregoing facts, the Court now makes and enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That a Decree of Divorce should be entered in favor of 
Plaintiff and against Defendant, provided, that the Decree should 
not become final until November 1, 1983. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Page 3 
Charlesworth vs. Charlesworth 
Civil No. 84525 
2. That the Plaintiff should be awarded the personal 
property now in his possession. 
3o That the minor children of the parties should be 
awarded to the Defendant, subject to reasonable visitation 
by the Plaintiff. 
4. That child support should be held in abeyance until 
further order of the Court. 








'^ 8 v.; o 
st'c-
MAX D. LAMPH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2564 Washington Blvd. #1 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 399-5885 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF 
LAURIAN P. CHARLESWORTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 84525 
This action came on regularly for hearing on the 1st day 
of August, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge 
of the above-entitled Court; MAX D. LAMPH appearing as counsel 
for Plaintiff and Plaintiff appearing in person, and Defendant 
having been duly served with process and her default for failure 
to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's Complaint within 
time allowed by law, and the Court having hearing the evidence 
introduced by Plaintiff, and the matter being submitted to the 
Court for its decision, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in writing, NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a Decre^of 
Divorce be and the same is hereby entered in favor of PlaintJ 
Recorded Boo\dL/H7. 
Page . . . . 
Indexed . 
•17S 
Decree of Divorce 
Charlesworth vs. Charlesworth 
Civil No. 84525 
Page 2 
and against Defendant, and that this Decree shall become final 
on November 1, 19 83. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff be and hereby is 
awarded the personal property now in his possession. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant be and hereby is 
awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children 
of the parties, subject to reasonable visitation by the Plaintiff, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED thct child support be held in abeyance 
until further order of the Court. 









DAVID L . WILKINSON #3472 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
MICHAEL D. SMITH #3 008 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
C h i e f , C i v i l E n f o r c e m e n t D i v i s i o n 
RICHARD J . CULBERTSON #40 21 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
2540 W a s h i n g t o n B l v d . , 4 t h F l o o r 
Ogden , U t a h 8 4 4 0 1 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 6 2 6 - 3 5 1 2 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAURIAN P . CHARLESWORTH, : .PETITION FOR SUPPORT 
: (URESA Case ) 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
v s . : 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND : Civil No. 845 25 
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH, : 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW t h e above-named d e f e n d a n t , by and t h r o u g h t h e 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ! s O f f i c e , who c o m p l a i n s of p l a i n t i f f and a l l e g e s 
as f o l l o w s : 
1 . T h i s i s a p r o c e e d i n g b r o u g h t unde r t h e Uniform 
R e c i p r o c a l Enfo rcemen t of Suppor t A c t , 7 7 - 3 1 - 1 , Utah Code 
A n n o t a t e d , 1 9 5 3 , as amended. 
2. T h a t s a i d a c t i o n was i n i t i a t e d w i t h t h e S t a t e of 
C a l i f o r n i a , wnich i s one of t he S t a t e s a d o p t i n g s a i d Ac t . The 
C le rk of t h i s C o u r t r e c e i v e d from t h e C l e r k of t h e S u p e r i o r 
C o u r t , of t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a , in and for t h e County of Los 
A n g e l e s , t h e a t t a c h e d documen t s , which a r e by r e f e r e n c e made a 
p a r t of t h i s P e t i t i o n . 
9 
JUL 5 2 c ^ P H ! 8 S 
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V. L o u r * i - . / u \1 . .-:Kf\ 
PETITION FOR SUPPORT 
P a g e 2 
3 . Tha t i n c l u d e d in s a i d p a p e r s a r e t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
URESA P e t i t i o n , C e r t i f i c a t e and O r d e r . That s a i d C e r t i f i c a t e 
p r o v i d e s , in p a r t , t h a t d e f e n d a n t owes a du ty of s u p p o r t for t h e 
s u p p o r t and m a i n t e n a n c e of h i s minor c h i l d ( r e n ) . 
4 . T h a t p l a i n t i f f i s d o m i c i l e d a t 2054 Orchard Avenue, 
in Weber County , U t a h , and w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e above -
e n t i t l e d C o u r t , and i s s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s a i d A c t . 
5 . T h a t t h e u n d e r s i g n e d i s t h e d u l y a s s i g n e d A s s i s t a n t 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l c h a r g e d w i t h t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of s a i d 
p r o c e e d i n g s f o r t h e S e c o n d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of U t a h , t h e 
r e s p o n d i n g S t a t e . 
WHEREFORE, d e f e n d a n t p r a y s t h e C o u r t i s s u e i t s O r d e r t o 
Show C a u s e r e q u i r i n g d e f e n d a n t t o a p p e a r and show c a u s e why he 
s h o u l d n o t be o r d e r e d and r e q u i r e d t o pay a r e a s o n a b l e sum e a c h 
mon th f o r and a s t h e s u p p o r t of h i s m i n o r c h i l d ( r e n ) , why 
j u d g m e n t s h o u l d n o t be a w a r d e d f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t i n a r r e a r s , and 
f o r o t h e r r e l i e f . 
DATED t h i s ^ day of J u n e , 1 9 8 8 . 
DAVID L . WILKINSON 
A t t o r n e y / G e n e r a l 
J . CUWERTSON 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
9 ~ 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, ?3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 8 4401 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAURIAN P. CHARLESWORTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF CALIFORMA and 
BTANCA H. CHARLESWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
CIVIL MO: 84525 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
18th day of October, 1988, before the Honorable Maurice 
Richards, Commissioner of the Domestic Relations Court, 
sitting without a ]ury, on the Defendants Reciprocal 
Non-Support action, and the Plaintiff appearing in person 
and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant, 
Blanca H. Charlesworth, not appearing in person and Attorney 
Carl Perry appearing in behalf of the Defendants, and 
argument having been made to the Court by both attorneys, 
and the Court being fully cognizant of all matters 
RECOMMFNDFn OPnFP ON 
Charlesworth vs. State of California, et al. 
Civil No: 84525 
pertaining therein, enters the following Recommended Order 
on Order to Show Cause and is set forth as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff is not granted any judgment for any 
arrearages in the above matter. 
2. That commencing November, 1988, the Plaintiff 
shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $76.00 per month per 
child as and for support for three (3) minor children, said 
payments shall be made to the Weber County Clerk's Office in 
two equal installments, one-half on the 5th and one-half on 
the 20th. 
3. That -he Weber County Clerk's Office is directed 
to hold said funds until the Defendant, Blanca H. 
Charlesworth, allows the Plaintiff visitation with the minor 
children. 
4. That the Court at this time concludes reasonable 
visitation to be four (4) weeks in the summer, plus Christ-
mas Day at noon and for four (4) days thereafter, provided 
however, the Plaintiff shall pay the costs of transportation 
to and from the Defendant's residence. 
Charlesworth vs. State of California, ^t'al^' 
Civil No: 84525 \ T ' ; - 3LERK 
c mu^+. ^nr.^v,^. o-u^  pumir.ri^  ^ n sitation the chi ] d 
support sha • 1 '-.<•• nbahc-': -oral. That there will be no 
abate-.'- . •- - • . a-^ct >. 
DATED ch is JJJ_ cay el Or^ fensr", 1988. 
• ' / 
[.E MAbBttOE RICHARDS 
Commissioner, Domestic 
Relations Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
,<M 
AJer€QJ9jj&y f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
O R D E R 
Show C a u s e s i g n e d and a p p r o v e d by t h e D i s t r i c t : Co1:. 
/ _ y _ d a y ofc^efeeheE-, 1 9 8 8 . 
BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE/"/ 
U 
DAVID L. WIJL.JMJ\^ . 2 
Attorney Genera I 
MICHAEL D. SMITH *? -.('••'•. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division Chief, Civ?1 F^* •* 
KARL G. PERRY #2570 
Assistant Attorney Genera. 
2540 Washington Bl™ 1 ^ ;. 
Ogden, Utah 8 4401 
Telephone: (#( ' . -:/n- • 
::eiiion t; 
l.lj I""! o o r 
ivesr-
f 
IN THE SECOND * C( nih"|' ! H« VIKHF'R COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAURT A! I I' CHAR I .ESWDRTH, 
Plaint ill., 
vs . 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA and 
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH, 
Defendant. 
CON TO RECOMMENDED 
ORDER 
Civil No: 8 4525 
COMES NOW, Kai Perry, coun^.-l MJI : he State of Utah 
n::d the defendant State n-F ^^lif-^-nin m-buanu lo 
' pr--"- '^": ,,-;:... paragraph J ana 4 of 
the proposed Recommended Order of Maurice Richards on the hearing 
dated October 1« i "Rfc • ~ -< J- . 
jourt .^..^;a juij.sdicL:ori i:u address any other 
issues other than child support since this is a UREFA ^ , H'on s^e 
UCA 77-31-31, 1951 a -^ -.. -Vd. C I S L law ...; ^nciions 
demonstrates that the Utah statute comports with rhe majority 
position on the limited jurisdiction involved 
Objection to Recommended Order 
Civil No: 84525 
Page 2 
proceedings. See Patterson v. Patterson, 581 P.2d 824 (Kan. 
App. 1978); See also Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (Kan. App. 
1974); and State ex rel., State of Washington v. Bozarth, 722 
P2d. 48 (Ore. App. 1986). 
Although these precedents from other jurisdictions are 
not controlling authority over this court, the Utah URESA 
provisions express clear legislative intent for courts to 
interpret the Utah provisions in accordance with interpretations 
given to URESA provisions from other jurisdictions. The act 
states in UCA 77-31-38 1953 as amended as follows: "this act 
shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate it's 
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states whicn 
enact it". Therefore, it is respectfully requested that those 
provisions of the Recommended Order dealing with child visitation 
be stricken and the rest of the Order be allowed to remain. 
DATED this day of November, 1988. 
is 
Assistant Attorney General 
" 6 
Objection to Recommended Order 
Civil No: "i—s 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
hereby certi !v t ^ ^ t nw-> ^M ; -orre^t °nr" -:f * ie 
ci'ctorney, ^ere N. Vlahos HL LeqaJ yorum :3ui.aing 2447 Kiese: 




PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. , #3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
^C 
: , H J . I ••£!«-: OF WEBER C O U N T Y 
^ ) i n i i _ u i u i M i l 
L A U R 
vs. 
\'.r<a\ r S W O R T H , 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA and 
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an exhibit concerning his attempt to contact the Defendant, 
Blanca H. Char 1esworth, for visitation, and the Court being 
fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters 
the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That all payments of support being made by the 
Plaintiff shall remain with the Clerk of the Court and shall 
be held by the Clerk of the Court until such time as Plain-
tiff is able to contact the Defendant and work out visita-
tion with the three (3) minor children. 
DATED this / H day of 
STANTOJJK'MJ TA 
District Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Defendants 
ORDER ON OBJECTION HEARING 2 
Char leswor L*: VL; 
Civil No: 84525 
rnia,_:et ail^, 
:LLHK 
>0 r : tin',! nn 10 is 
5 . Tl is t during til ie summer vi si tati on the chi 3 d 
support s h a 11 be aba t e d i i i t o t a ] T I: i a I : 1:1 ie i e w :i ] ] 1 : = • i i : 
abatement, during the Christmas vacation, 
DA*- V 
IONORABLE MASJjjttOE RICHARDS 
C o m m i s s i o n e r , D o m e s t i c 
R e 1 a t i o r n n *"> v. r t 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
y f o r D e f e n d - r * s 
O R D E R 
The v. bove and foregoing Recommended Order on Or^o1- to 
Show Caus^ signed and approved by the District Court on this 
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BY THE COURT 
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